Liu, Yanyan

Barrett, Christopher B.

Narayanan, Sudha

Das, Upasak

This study investigates the consequences of poor implementation in public workfare programs, focusing on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. Using nationally representative data, we test empirically for a discouraged worker effect arising from either of two mechanisms: administrative rationing of jobs among those who seek work and delays in wage payments. We find strong evidence at the household and district levels that administrative rationing discourages subsequent demand for work. Delayed wage payments seem to matter significantly during rainfall shocks. We find further that rationing is strongly associated with indicators of implementation ability such as staff capacity. Politics appears to play only a limited role. The findings suggest that assessments of the relevance of public programs over their lifecycle need to factor in implementation quality.

The “Discouraged Worker Effect” in public works programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India

Violette, William

This paper explores the evolution of real agricultural wages, machinery use, and the relationship between farm size and productivity in Vietnam during its dramatic structural transformation over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. Using six rounds of nationally representative household survey data, we find strong evidence that the inverse relationship between rice productivity and planting area attenuated significantly over this period and that the attenuation was most pronounced in areas with higher real wages. This pattern is also associated with sharp increases in machinery use, indicating a scale-biased substitution effect between machinery and labor. The results suggest that rural-factor market failures are receding in importance, making land concentration less of a cause of concern for aggregate food production.

Structural transformation and intertemporal evolution of real wages, machine use, and farm size–productivity relationships in Vietnam

Sheahan, Megan

While government spending on pro-poor community asset creation and income-transfers could have compounding positive effects on poverty reduction, it is important to first study trends in the allocation of funds, particularly as they relate to the susceptibility of the program to political clientelism. This paper uses expenditure data at the local level in Andhra Pradesh from Indias National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, a rights-based program distributing both public and private goods, to investigate the relationship between voting outcomes and program intensity in the seven years straddling a major election. By focusing on one state where accountability and transparency mechanisms have been employed and implementation efforts have been applauded, the authors do not find evidence of blatant vote buying before the 2009 election but do find that patronage played a small part in fund distribution after the 2009 election. Indeed most variation in expenditures is explained by the observed needs of potential beneficiaries, as the scheme intended.

Barrett, Christopher B.

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