Matt Matravers

Claes Lernestedt

The state's use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law's burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of 'blameworthiness' needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law's person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law's person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new 'knowledge', and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law's person as 'theirs'? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law's person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.

The Criminal Law’s Person

Will Kymlicka

What place, if any, ought cultural considerations have when we blame and punish in the criminal law? In general, to hold someone criminally responsible is to hold them blameworthy and deserving of their punishment. Background cultural factors seem to threaten this: for example, a person may be ignorant of the way things are done

Claes Lernestedt

About

Books

Join the club