U S Military

Department of Defense (Dod)

Squadron Officer College

Recent violations of the Air Force Core Values by Airmen at all grades have caused some observers to question the ethical and moral health of the US Air Force. By introducing the Core Values, the US Air Force established an ethical foundation for all Airmen. Both intrinsic moral values and external drivers influence the decisions and actions of an individual. While many different factors may influence an individual to violate the Core Values, the common theme is that the Core Values, especially Integrity First, have lost connection to mission accomplishment. We define this disconnect as the Core Values Gap. Airmen often do not connect the Core Values to mission accomplishment and as a result many may not have a deep understanding or adoption of the Core Values in their work and personal lives. Four main drivers of this gap are examined and a four-step approach aimed to empower leaders and reform policies is recommended to enable the US Air Force to address the problem.By reviewing research on the theory of moral decision-making, examining case studies, and discussing ethics in the Air Force with two focus groups of Senior NCOs and Air War College students, a clear picture emerged that leadership is a key center of gravity to establishing an ethical climate. In addition, policies and institutional mechanisms play a major role in either incentivizing or discouraging ethical behavior. A four-step approach to address the problem is proposed; namely, equip commanders with a tool called the Core Values Check; educate them on how to instill the Core Values into their unit's daily operations; provide commanders with a Core Values Toolkit to help them start regular Core Values discussions; and reduce barriers to reporting infractions. By focusing on commanders as centers of gravity for influencing moral action, the US Air Force can create an environment that improves and promotes ethical behavior.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.1. Introduction * 2. Research Methodology * 3. Drivers of the Core Values Gap * Zero-Defect Standards * Misapplication of the Wingman Concept * Gaps Between Core Values Education and Training * Disparate Reporting Programs * 4. How to Close the Core Values Gap * Step 1: The Core Values Check * Step 2: Equip Commanders * Step 3: Develop a toolkit * Step 4: Reform institutions * 5. Conclusion

Connecting United States Air Force Core Values to Mission Accomplishment - Zero-Defect Standards, Misapplication of the Wingman Concept, Gaps Between Education and Training, Disparate Reporting

U. S. Military

Juan Santiago Jr

In 2005, the U.S. military found itself inadequately prepared with doctrine and materiel to wage counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. As the insurgency adapted to American tactics, the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) became a target of the insurgency because of its lack of armor, which led to significant casualties caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The U.S. response to the IED threat to HMMWVs was to procure the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle, a costly endeavor. The MRAP increased Soldier and Marine survival rates during IED attacks, but other aspects of the vehicle contradicted counterinsurgency strategy. Because of its survivability, leaders expected tactical commanders to use the MRAP, which reduced tactical commanders' variety of options to engage the enemy. This research explores the value of variety in major military systems by applying concepts from the Law of Requisite Variety and uses the MRAP as an example of a materiel solution throughout. Increasing system variety conflicts with current acquisition practices, which prefer commonality. This research finds that warfighter capabilities increase with variety, but variety is contra to achieving commonality and cost savings. To achieve a balance between commonality and variety, the authors suggest organizational and system hardware alternatives. I. INTRODUCTION * A. SUMMARY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN IRAQ FOLLOWING MAJOR COMBAT ACTIONS * B. RELEVANT HISTORY OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE USE IN IRAQ * C. AN ENEMY FORESEEN * D. RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH * II. COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE * A. WHAT IS AN INSURGENCY? * 1. A Long Conflict * 2. Against a Government * 3. Normally Fought by Unequal Enemies * 4. Without Restriction * 5. To Achieve Political Objectives * B. WHAT IS A COUNTERINSURGENCY? * 1. Legitimizing the Incumbent Government * 2. Through Unified and Committed Response * 3. Against an Insurgency * 4. Using the Full Spectrum of Military Power * C. MATERIEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY * D. SUMMARY * III. DOD' S ACQUISITION FRAMEWORK VS. THE MRAP * A. HOW DOES THE DOD GENERATE REQUIREMENTS? * 1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System * 2. Defense Acquisition System * 3. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) * B. WHY THE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLE? * 1. The Unforeseen: Why Was the DOD Slow to Procure the MRAP? * 2. Why Did the DOD Finally Procure the MRAP? * C. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT * 1. Uniqueness of the Purchase * 2. Speed of MRAP Testing, Fielding, and Deployment * D. SUMMARY * IV. THE LAW OF REQUISITE VARIETY * A. THE FIELD OF CYBERNETICS * B. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF REQUISITE VARIETY * 1. Common Applications of Law of Requisite Variety * 2. Incremental Application of Law of Requisite Variety * 3. The Importance of Variety in LORV * 4. Clarifications for Military Applications of LORV * C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR VARIETY IN THE CURRENT ACQUISITION SYSTEM * D. SUMMARY OF LAW OF REQUISITE VARIETY * V. INTERSECTION OF COMPETING PRIORITIES * A. WHY IS THE INTERSECTION CRITICAL? * B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VARIETY IN COMBAT * C. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COMMONALITY * D. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF VARIETY * E. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES * F. THE DEMAND FOR VARIETY IN THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM * G. RECOMMENDATIONS * 1. Create a Variety Advocate Function * 2. Increase Focus on Subsystem Commonality * H. CHAPTER SUMMARY * VI. CONCLUSION * A. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS * B. AREAS FOR CONTINUED RESEARCH

History and Analysis of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (Mrap) Procurement to Fight the Ied Threat in the Iraq War, Applicability of the Law of Requisite Variety in Major Military System Acquisition

Katherine Linton

Thirteen years ago, the United States entered into a Global War on Terror (GWOT) and has deployed over 2.5 million troops in three operations: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, the Philippines and other locations; Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); and Operation New Dawn (OND) in Iraq. Approximately 42 percent of servicemembers have deployed more than once in support of GWOT. As with earlier wars, the GWOT wrought physical and psychological war trauma to wounded warriors - and these visible or invisible injuries affect their lives forever. But the effects and recovery vary from person to person. This paper asks whether the visibility of the injury plays a role in a wounded warrior's resiliency. Ultimately, I find the visibility of the injury has some influence on a wounded warrior's resiliency across four recurring resiliency themes: first, a wounded warrior's personal support network; second, his or her core convictions; third, the types of rehabilitative programs available; and fourth, his or her military identity and experience. Thirteen years ago, the United States entered into a Global War on Terror (GWOT) and has deployed over 2.5 million troops in three operations: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, the Philippines and other locations; Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); and Operation New Dawn (OND) in Iraq. Approximately 42 percent of servicemembers have deployed more than once in support of GWOT. As with earlier wars, the GWOT wrought physical and psychological war trauma to wounded warriors - and these visible or invisible injuries affect their lives forever. But the effects and recovery vary from person to person. This paper asks whether the visibility of the injury plays a role in a wounded warrior's resiliency. Ultimately, I find the visibility of the injury has some influence on a wounded warrior's resiliency across four recurring resiliency themes: first, a wounded warrior's personal support network; second, his or her core convictions; third, the types of rehabilitative programs available; and fourth, his or her military identity and experience.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.As of January 19, 2015, two percent (52,345) of deployed servicemembers have been wounded in action with additional research showing that the visible injury prevalence includes 1 percent amputations; 10-13 percent musculoskeletal, shrapnel, blindness or other eye injuries; 1 percent burns; 54 percent multiple injuries to extremities; and 29 percent head and neck injuries. Although the overall percentage of troops with visible injuries is small, the prevalence of invisible wounds in the 2.5 million GWOT veterans is astounding. Experts estimate at least 50 percent of GWOT veterans will seek treatment for one or more problems such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), depression, suicide attempt, and/or substance abuse. Studies also show that 31.8 percent of wounded warriors with visible injuries also suffer from PTSD. Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) is another invisible injury in GWOT wounded warriors, affecting nearly 20 percent. When visible and invisible injury prevalence is combined, one can see the impact the Global War on Terror has had on our servicemembers and their lives now as wounded warriors.

Resiliency in Global War on Terror's Wounded Warriors - Personal Support Network, Core Convictions, Available Rehabilitative Programs, Military Identity and Experience

Bouncing Back from War Trauma

Donald Taylor II

Two excellent reports are compiled in this unique document. The first, Islamic Extremists Love the Internet, explores the exploitation of the World Wide Web to develop home-grown terrorists. The second, Reconceptualizing Radicalized Groups and Their Messages, explores alternative approaches for special forces to engage with radicalized groups. Our compilation reproduction also includes, as a bonus, the complete 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment, a substantial document with updated analysis of dozens of critical national security issues.Islamic Extremists Love the Internet - Al-Qaeda and its network of followers have had great success during this decade with their efforts to influence the West. Which cyber tool have these terrorists used as their main weapon to achieve their objectives? What effect is this having on America's younger generation? Since September 11, 2001 Islamic extremist terrorists have been exploiting the Internet to promote their radical ideology and today they are targeting select youth, developing them into homegrown terrorists who support their cause. A careful study of select terror Web sites reflects that jihadists are promoting their propaganda and highlighting successful operations directed against our government and the U.S. military. What cyber techniques are being used for persuasion? This author's thesis is that Islamic extremists are exploiting the Internet resulting in the development of homegrown terrorists a serious vulnerability which the U.S. government has inadequately addressed. How does this threat impact the Department of Defense and the combat commander's mission? This premise illustrates how the terrorists are gathering sensitive information, occasionally critical information, and valuable data points from the Internet and using these resources to construct combat operational planning directed against our forces. Operational security education is paramount for all department employees and military commands. This paper illustrates the OPSEC process. It also recommends a strategic counter-strategy to the extremists' Web site influence.Reconceptualizing Radicalized Groups and Their Messages - What this occasional paper explores are alternative approaches for SOF to engage with radicalized groups. As an example, at present, mainstream defense and intelligence analysts proclaim the prowess of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in social media-a result of both reach and authenticity. The solution? Comprehensive engagement in the narrative space to defeat the effects of ISIS in the psychological and sociological aspects of the human domain. TThe Department of State's recently activated Global Engagement Center (GEC) is tasked with an arguably overdue role in coordinating U.S.-wide, counter-violent-extremist communication efforts. The GEC not only aims to reduce duplication of effort, it likewise aspires to identify nationwide priorities and ways and means for agencies to complement each other's counter-narrative efforts by comparing notes across those agencies. Even with improved coordination and perspective, communication narratives can never tell an entire political violence or radicalization story. For example, research finds that individuals pre-disposed to causing harm are more vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.. Also, assessment of narratives and/ or social media data ignores the impact/effect of a growing female recruitment base on vulnerable males. Therefore, it's important to think wider and deeper. Rethinking this problem from a joint social psychology-notably realistic conflict theory (RCT)- and social network analysis approach can yield unprecedented insights on the inner workings of radicalized groups and their penchant for political violence.

Islamic Extremists Love the Internet, and Reconceptualizing Radicalized Groups and Their Messages - Making of Potential Home-Grown Terrorists, Counter-Strategies, Use of Social Media, Opsec Process

David Tyler Long

Cyberspace operations are an increasingly important mission focus and warfighting domain within the Department of Defense (DOD). There are a number of educational courses and training exercises that have been developed to prepare leaders to plan and execute cyberspace-based effects to support operations; however, there are currently no virtual simulations used by the military to train and educate servicemembers in the basic concepts of cyberspace operations. Because of this training gap, we have designed and developed CyberWar: 2025, a simultaneous turn-based multiplatform computer-based educational wargame that is intended to be used as a support tool for education and training of basic cyberspace operations concepts to military professionals and other DOD personnel. The objective of CyberWar: 2025 is to stimulate, build, and increase the players' knowledge base and experience in planning and practical application of cyberspace operations in the areas of defensive cyberspace operations, offensive cyberspace operations, and computer network exploitation. CyberWar: 2025 focuses on doctrine and doctrinal training as a serious game by reinforcing key learning objectives set by the DOD; however, this wargame also encourages player engagement and motivation through unique and balanced multiplayer interactions within a virtual environment. I. INTRODUCTION * A. WHY WE USE GAMES * B. WHY DO GAMES WORK? * C. PURPOSE AND TARGET AUDIENCE OF CYBERWAR: 2025 * D. CYBERWAR: 2025 SUPPORTING EDUCATION AND TRAINING * II. GAMIFICATION OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS FOR EDUCATION * A. HISTORY OF WARGAMING AND GAMIFICATION * B. EXAMPLES OF USE IN EDUCATION * C. EXAMPLES OF USES IN THE MILITARY * D. EXAMPLES OF USES FOCUSING ON CYBER * 1. CyberCIEGE * 2. CyberStrike * III. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CYBERWAR: 2025 * A. HOW CYBERWAR: 2025 IS DIFFERENT * B. CYBERWAR: 2025 LEARNING OBJECTIVES * C. SCOPING AND GAMIFYING THE CYBER PROBLEM * D. METHODS USED IN DEVELOPMENT * E. DESIGN OF CYBERWAR: 2025 * F. INITIAL DESIGN PHASE * 1. Redesigning and Refining * 2. Reduction in Game Complexity * 3. Cyber Effects Window and Research Investment Table * 4. Employment of Exploitation Effects and Strategy * G. DEVELOPMENT PHASE * 1. Working Group * 2. Software Improved Gameplay * 3. Initial Software Development Pitfalls * 4. Web-Browser-Based Development and Implementation * IV. CYBERWAR: 2025 OVERVIEW AND WALKTHROUGH * A. OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY * B. CYBER EFFECT ACTIONS IN CYBERWAR: 2025 * 1. Defensive Cyberspace Operations Effects (DCO) * 2. Offensive Cyberspace Operations Effects (OCO) * 3. Computer Network Exploitation Effects (CNE) * C. CYBERWAR: 2025 INITIAL SETUP AND PLAY * D. DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED CYBER EFFECTS CAPABILITIES * E. WINNING/ENDING CYBERWAR: 2025 * F. WALKTHROUGH OF INITIAL ROUNDS FROM THE RED PLAYER PERSPECTIVE OF "DOTEVIL" * V. FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION * A. ATTRIBUTION AND POSSIBLE RETRIBUTION * B. ADDITIONAL OCO, DCO, AND CNE EFFECTS AND TIES TO OPE AND MANEUVER ELEMENTS. * C. BALANCING OF CYBER EFFECTS AND SERVER POINT REBUILDING * D. ALLIANCES, TEAM COMMUNICATION, AND SUPPORTED MOVES * E. CONCLUSION * APPENDIX A. RULESET * A. HOW TO PLAY * B. ORDERS/EFFECTS * C. CYBER EFFECT DESCRIPTIONS * 1. Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO) * 2. Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO) * 3. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) * D. INTER-DOMAIN ACTIONS * E. LINKS AND VISIBILITY * APPENDIX B. RANDOMIZATION AND ADJUDICATION MATH * APPENDIX C. RELATIONSHIP OF LEARNING OBJECTIVES TO ACTIONS IN CYBERWAR:2025

2025 - Support Tool for Training of Basic Cyberspace Operations Concepts to Military Professionals, Building Player's Knowledge Base and Experience

Interactive Wargaming Cyberwar

Don Rassler

The Islamic State is a group known for doing things a bit differently, for its capacity for innovation, and for its many 'firsts.' Two of those 'firsts' happened within months of each other. The first occurred in October 2016 when the group used a bomb-laden drone to kill, after the explosive hidden within the drone killed two Kurdish peshmerga soldiers who were investigating the device. Another 'first' happened in January 2017 when the Islamic State released a propaganda video that showed nearly a dozen examples of the group releasing munitions on its enemies from the air with a fair degree of accuracy via quadcopter drones it had modified. And it wasn't long before the group's bomb-drop capable drones would go on to kill, too. After reaching a high point in the spring of 2017, the scale of the Islamic State drone threat-like many other dimensions of the group and its power-has already been significantly degraded. A surprisingly little amount of analytical attention, however, has been given to how the Islamic State was able to pull off its drone feats and bring its program to scale in a relatively short amount of time. This report seeks to address this gap by evaluating the main factors that helped the Islamic State to effectively use modified commercial drones as weapons. It also highlights some of the broader threat and policy implications associated with the Islamic State's pioneering use of drones.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.1. Executive Summary * 2. Introduction * 3. Keep It Simple, Stupid! The Islamic State's Tactical and Operational Drone Innovations * 4. Scale, Sources, and Manufacturing * 5. From Point Of Purchase to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq: The IBACS Conspiracy * 6. From Recovered Drones to Suppliers: Retracing Islamic State Drone Purchases * 7. Drone Games, Terror Drone Diffusion, and Near-Term Threats * 8. Future Terror Drone Use * 9. Conclusion

Supply, Scale, and Future Threats - IBACS Conspiracy, Future Terror Drone Uses, ISIS Operational Drone Innovations, The Bangladesh Factor, Keep it Simple, Stupid!

The Islamic State and Drones

Matthew Hyland

This paper examines the defense organizational responses to the emergence of air and space as warfighting domains and, using these experiences as points of comparison, applies the same logic to consider the question: Should the Department of Defense create an independent US Cyber Force? The author determines that the Army Air Forces had achieved de facto independent status within the War Department by 1942, but airpower advocates continued to press for separation to more effectively advocate for budget share. In 1947 five forces aligned for the first time to support separating air forces from the army: airpower had proven successful in recent combat during World War II; the Army Air Forces had matured into an autonomous institution capable of independence; Army and War Department leadership actively supported a separate airpower service; vigorous Presidential support emerged for airpower to have organizational parity; and a comprehensive reorganization of nation's security apparatus was underway. In contrast, none of these factors were present when the Space Commission elected not to recommend the creation of an independent space force in 2001. With respect to cyber forces, only one of the five factors, broader national security reform, is partially met. As a result, creation of an independent cyber service appears unlikely in the near term.It took over 40 years of military experience with the air weapon and two global wars for the United States Congress to establish an independent United States Air Force. In the same way that organizational independence strengthened airpower, military space operations would benefit greatly from organizational differentiation, independent doctrine and leadership development, and tailored administrative support. The lack of a credible existential threat to national security from that domain, however, has hindered the effort to make the leap to an independent space corps or force. Finding an insufficient and incoherent cadre of space leaders and doctrine in 2001, the Space Commission nudged the Air Force bureaucracy down a path which may in the future be more conducive to organizational independence for space power.At present, none of the five critical factors for separation as identified analysis of Air Force independence align in favor of a separate cyber service. First, there is no recent record of cyberspace combat success that compares in scope or impact to that of airpower in World War II. Second, unlike the cohesive Army Air Forces which formed the corpus of the United States Air Force upon its creation in 1947, cyberspace forces today are spread throughout the four existing services.Third, none of the existing services has indicated a willingness to cede its role in the cyberspace mission, and the resources currently allocated to it, to form a cyber service. In contrast, Army and War Department leadership in 1947 actively supported the transfer of resources necessary to create the United States Air Force. Fourth, the President's cyberspace policy takes no position on the internal Department of Defense organizational construct; unlike in the case for airpower, when President Truman unequivocally advocated for a separate Air Force. The case for the fifth factor, comprehensive national security reorganization, is less straightforward. While several defense-reform efforts are presently underway in Congress with at least a modicum of support from the Defense Secretary, it is unclear if they will approach the transformative scope of the 1947 reorganization which birthed the Air Force. Nevertheless, with none of the other four factors aligned in favor of cyber independence at this time, creation of a cyber service appears highly unlikely in the near term.

Historical Precedents - History of Army Air Force, New Forces After World War II, Analysis of Possible Independent Space Force and Cyberspace Force Services

Creating a New Military Service

Kyle Thompson

Considering the significant consequences of nuclear proliferation, this study asserts that historical case studies yield lessons learned that inform the suitability of Special Operations Forces' (SOF) role within counterproliferation efforts that can help guide development of SOF counterproliferation-related missions. The important aspects of each case form the basis of the evaluation: the agility of SOF in relation to the success of the mission being examined. In other words, if the conditions enabling an organization's agility are present, an organization is more likely to be successful in its counterproliferation role. To determine cogent lessons from SOF's history informing the suitability of its role in counterproliferation, the study begins with a survey of SOF characteristics. Next, a historical analysis of two representative case studies was evaluated to judge the success of the operations and adherence to SOF principles and concepts. Both cases highlight that understanding the threat and attacking proliferation networks can be enhanced with coordination across SOF organizations internally and through partnerships fostered by engagement of United States SOF abroad. Qualities of increased familiarity with counterproliferation, consistent communication with weapons specialists, and coordination through security cooperation are present in the studies and can be applied to contemporary pathway defeat efforts.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Introduction * A. Research Question * B. Literature Review * 1. Counterproliferation and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction * 2. Special Operations * 3. Special Operations Forces Capabilities * 4. Current Thinking on Implementation * 5. Projected Findings * C. Approach and Methodology * D. Special Operations and History * II. Operation Gunnerside * A. Historical Summary * 1. Tronstadt's Involvement * 2. Information and Agility * 3. Effective Adjustments * 4. Specially Selected * B. Effects and Analysis * III. The Alsos Mission * A. Historical Summary * 1. Resources and Authority * 2. Adaptation * 3. Coordination * B. Effects and Analysis * IV. Conclusion * A. Recommendations * B. Opportunities for Future ResearchGiven the United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) new authority to coordinate Department of Defense (DoD) countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) efforts, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are potentially positioned to assume a more impactful role within that mission. Special Operations Forces can use the transition of this authority from United States Strategic Command to USSOCOM as an opportunity to evaluate its role. To fully capitalize on this opportunity-and to avoid mistaking reorganization for progress-it is important to answer the following questions: What lessons can be learned from SOF's history to inform the suitability of this role, and how can SOF leverage these lessons to enhance performance? Understanding the capabilities and opportunities involved in SOF's role in CWMD is imperative to avoid the mistake of confusing reorganization for progress.

Lessons from History - Case Study of Actions Against Nazi Germany Nuclear Programs in World War II, Operation Gunnerside and the Alsos Mission

Special Operations Forces and Counterproliferation

John Morgan III

The United States and its Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shifted their collective focus away from the North Atlantic in the early 1990s because Russia was no longer a dominant threat to Western security as it had been during the Cold War. After two decades of fighting in the Middle East (since the 1990-1991 Gulf War), in 2011, the United States announced a "pivot to the Asia-Pacific region." Since 2014, however, a resurgent Russia has caused the Alliance to once again turn its attention to the North Atlantic. This thesis assesses Iceland's role in NATO during the Cold War and beyond. It relies on historical information to develop analyses on alliance management and the power of small states. The thesis then turns to contemporary events and sources to explain NATO's heightened state of alarm in the face of an increasingly aggressive and opportunistic Kremlin. Western air and naval forces have witnessed a marked increase in confrontational incidents with Russian military forces, and East-West tension has increased. In this context of NATO's "pivot back to the North Atlantic," Iceland's geostrategic value to the Alliance has again come to the fore.Although Iceland has never had a national military establishment, it was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Due to its geographic location, it has been an extraordinarily important Ally despite its small economy and lack of military forces. However, Iceland's membership in the Alliance was called into question several times from the 1950s through the 1970s due to various factors. Why was Iceland's place in the Alliance somewhat precarious during that time, and might these factors affect Iceland's future role in NATO? How have Iceland's domestic politics affected its actions in the Alliance? What parallels can be drawn between Iceland and other countries with regard to small states in international politics and alliance relations?In the years immediately following World War II, many of the belligerents in the war pioneered novel military alliances with each other. Some of these new alliances reflected an "East versus West" confrontation of communism versus free-market democracy that lasted for more than 40 years. The strongest of these alliances, NATO, was formed in 1949. There were 12 founding members in NATO: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.One of these countries might seem incongruous in a military alliance because it has never had a national military establishment: the Republic of Iceland. A small country with a comparatively moderate population size, Iceland is separated from mainland Europe by hundreds of miles of sea. In modern times, Iceland has been a nation of peaceful citizens who do not regularly involve themselves in the affairs of other nations. Iceland turned its back on 400 years of preferring non-engagement in military affairs when it helped to found NATO, a military alliance, in 1949. Why did Iceland join NATO as a founding member, and how important are its contributions to the Alliance?

Iceland's Contributions to NATO Since 1949 - Alliance Pivot Back to the North Atlantic to Counter Russia and Putin, Big Power of Small States, Alarm at Aggressive Kremlin

No Country an Island

Timothy Herritage

The current conflict the United States and its coalition partners are engaged in with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is largely ideological. The West's narrative of liberal democracy runs counter to that of ISIS's brand of Islamic extremism bent on Sharia law. ISIS recently revealed it has devoted significant effort to a domain that offers it a more even playing field in which to challenge those who oppose it. The skill with which it produced a video of the terrorist group's murder of a Jordanian pilot indicates an advanced understanding of visual communication. This and other instances of an increased emphasis on operations within the information battlespace deserve close scrutiny. The U.S. Air Force faces two major obstacles in contending with this issue: first, cultural and organizational emphasis on the communications requirements associated with equipping the Air Force as opposed to operational communications and second, the risk aversion endemic to large bureaucracies. This research paper will analyze instances of ISIS's increased, more sophisticated efforts in the realm of communication and using that information, will suggest strategies to overcome the obstacles to the Air Force contending with this challenge, not only with respect to ISIS, but any enemy seeking to engage in the information battlespace. Although these efforts overlap at times with what the U.S. military calls Psychological Operations or Military Information Support Operations, for the purposes of this paper, the analysis will focus solely on Public Affairs (PA) efforts to influence the enemy.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.The terrorist group ISIS recently revealed it has devoted significant effort to a domain that offers it a more even playing field in which to challenge those who oppose the group. The skill with which ISIS members produced a video of their murder of a Jordanian pilot indicates an advanced understanding of visual communication. This and other instances of an increased emphasis on operations within the information battlespace deserve close scrutiny. Such efforts should send a signal to the military and to the Air Force in particular-our enemies will seek to fight us in the arena of their choosing, not ours. The Air Force faces two major obstacles in contending with this issue: first, organizational emphasis on traditional air operations and the requirements to conduct those operations and second, the risk aversion endemic to large bureaucracies like military services.

A Level Playing Field for the Asymmetric Foe - Analysis of ISIS Efforts in Communications, Obstacles to Public Affairs Efforts by the USAF to Influence the Enemy

The Information Battlespace

Anton Balsirow

Current academic literature is replete with analyses on the return of great power competition due to China's rise. One area of concern among policy makers has been China's One Belt and One Road Initiative (BRI) and its impact on global security. This thesis examines India and Pakistan's reactions to China's BRI through analysis of political, economic, and geostrategic factors. India's non-support for the BRI stems from the perception that the BRI poses a direct threat to the rules-based international system and its own aspirations to become the South Asian region's dominant power. Conversely, Pakistan supports and has actively engaged in the BRI to counter a growing India and to increase its national power to achieve that end.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Introduction and Overview * A. Significance of Research * B. Literature Review * 1. India's Economic Explanations * 2. India's Political Explanations * 3. India's Geostrategic Explanations * 4. Pakistan's Economic Explanations * 5. Pakistan's Political Explanations * 6. Pakistan's Geostrategic Explanations * C. Potential Explanations and Hypothesis Evidence * D. Research Design * E. Thesis Overview * II. India and the BRI * A. India's Political Explanations: Maintenance Of U.S.-Led International Rules * B. India's Economic Explanations * C. India's Geostrategic Explanations * D. Conclusion * III. Pakistan and the BRI * A. Overview Of Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) * B. Explanatory Factors * 1. Geostrategic * 2. Economic * 3. Political * C. CONCLUSION * IV. Conclusion * A. Overall Findings * 1. Main Ideas * 2. Policy RecommendationsChina's BRI, an extensive foreign policy and economic initiative, has already made massive inroads in South Asia. Thus, the BRI has become a symbol of Chinese soft power in the region. China is attempting to advance its positive image in South Asia, spurring regional economic growth by tapping into underdeveloped markets via inter-regional connectivity. As a result, the BRI could open the flow of trade and wealth to member countries. Specifically affecting India are the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor, and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). These three economic corridors represent the BRI in South Asia and will eventually be incorporated into the greater BRI enterprise.

India, Pakistan, and China's One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI) - Political, Economic and Geostrategic Factors in OBOR Indian Rejection, Pakistan Engagement, Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Alexander Perkins

Americans were largely surprised when the intelligence community revealed that Russia had launched a widespread influence operation focused on the 2016 U.S. presidential election. With their high-tech, social-media focus, these practices struck many as a newly implemented tactic against the United States. However, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed and deployed influence operations-then called "active measures"-against the United States and its allies. During the last decade of the Cold War, the United States actively and systematically combatted this threat. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, active measures seemed to fade into history as well. This study argues that Russia has reincarnated this Cold War relic and is using active measures throughout the world to advance its strategic interests, especially in its post-Soviet space. Russia is utilizing 21st-century technology to gain access to Western populations and sow discord, distrust, and disorder. Thus, this study examines the Soviet-era active measures, the U.S. Cold War countermeasures, and Russian active measures today to make recommendations on ways to counter this form of malevolent influence. This study finds that the United States should organize purposefully and consistently to counter Russian active measures, educate the American public to increase its resiliency against foreign influence, and intensify its strategic public diplomacy efforts throughout Europe.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Introduction * A. Major Research Question * B. Significance of the Research Question * C. Literature Review * 1. Validity of the Threat * 2. The Cold War Never Ended * 3. NATO Enlargement Created Tension * D. Potential Explanations and Hypotheses * E. Research Design * F. Study Overview and Chapter Outline * II. Active Measures Defined * A. Western Terminology * 1. Propaganda * 2. Disinformation and Misinformation * 3. Political Warfare * 4. Public Diplomacy * 5. Information Operations * B. Defining Active Measures * C. Conclusion * III. Soviet Active Measures During The Cold War * A. Soviet Active Measures * B. Soviet Active Measures Techniques * 1. Media Disinformation * 2. Forgeries * 3. Agents of Influence * 4. Front Groups/Organizations * C. Countering Soviet Active Measures * 1. First Era of Countermeasures: End of WWII to Reagan's Election * 2. Second Era of Countermeasures: The Reagan Administration to the Collapse * D. Conclusion * IV. Russian Active Measures * A. The Rebirth Of Active Measures * B. Russia's Military Perspective * C. Russian Active Measures Apparatus * 1. The Presidential Executive Office * 2. Intelligence Services * D. Russian Active Measures Techniques * 1. Media Disinformation * 2. Forgeries * 3. Agents of Influence * 4. NGO, GONGOs, and Civic Groups as Front Group Substitutes * E. Conclusion * Current U.S. Countermeasures * B. What Is To Be Done? * 1. Impose Sanctions * 2. Develop an Interagency Focused on Russian Active Measures * 3. Create Strategic Communications against Russia's Malevolent Influence * 4. Increase International Broadcasting Capability * 5. Promote Fact-Checking * 6. Institute Offensive Cyber Operations * 7. Build Resiliency through EducationThis study hypothesizes that Russia's active measures consist of the same fundamental techniques that the Soviets used during the Cold War that are only modified for use in the 21st century. Russia has increased its active measures' audience by taking advantage of technological developments such as social media and the Internet.

What Is to Be Done? Cold War History, Efforts by Putin and Russia in Propaganda, Disinformation, Forgeries, Ngos and Civic Groups as Front Groups

Soviet Active Measures Reborn for the 21st Century

Lance Baxter

"Defense" of any system against all highly improbable, but significant events, what are sometimes referred to as Black Swan events, is not possible. These events are, by their very nature unpredictable and uncertain, which is why they so dominate our thinking, and our culture. The work of Nassim Taleb regarding these highly improbable events and his proposed approach of "antifragility" may have utility in studying what the USAF should do in order to be prepared for the future in cyber operations. This approach emphasizes the futility of trying to predict when/where and how these highly improbable but significant events will occur and of preparing to defend against those scenarios. This leads to a "barbell strategy" based on an understanding of the probability and consequence of both positive and negative Black Swan events, which maximizes optionality while ensuring against systemic failure. Three essential elements emerge from this as critical to building "antifragility" into our national cyber capabilities. The first is the need to truly understand our minimum required capabilities, to acknowledge what ruin would really look like so that it can be avoided at the lowest possible cost. Second, how can optimal learning be built into the system, allowing the inevitable shocks of any magnitude to make the system stronger. Finally, what construct, organization or approach can efficiently and effectively incentivize the high-risk/high-payoff end of the spectrum. There is a demonstrated history of throwing around Pearl Harbor and the attacks of 9/11 as cyber scenarios to defend against or prepare for. In this assessment, the potentially more helpful analogies of the Battle of Britain and the Maginot Line will be evaluated as well. This will help to examine the potential application of "antifragility" and the associated "barbell strategy" to USAF strategic preparations for conflict in the cyber domain.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.The United States is arguably the most internet dependent nation on Earth, and our military is keenly aware of the risks that this dependence poses. A quick internet search of "cyber Pearl Harbor" and "cyber 9/11" shows that these concepts have been publicly discussed since at least November 1997, when Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre testified to congress about the dangers of an "electronic Pearl Harbor". In later interviews, he credited Air Force General Tom Marsh with "authoring the phrase". There is a vast array of published work on both "cyber Pearl Harbor" and "cyber 9/11" that indicates there is no shortage of awareness something dire might happen in cyberspace. Even Secretary Hamre has acknowledged that it may not have been the best analogy to use at the time he first introduced it. Almost invariably, these terms are used to demonstrate that we should be doing something different in order to avoid or defend against the cyber-equivalent of those traumatic events. What do "cyber Pearl Harbor" or "cyber 9/11" even mean? Beyond the scare tactic of bringing up a traumatic event from our collective social memory, each of these scenarios can be seen to represent a different type of unanticipated attack on the United States. What is lost in the sensationalism that often surrounds bringing up these analogies is that they actually can represent scenarios that should be deeply and carefully considered, but not necessarily in the way that scare-mongers would suggest. The utility of scenarios in understanding different aspects of cyber conflict is not limited to these two oft-cited examples. There are other analogies in the recent history of warfare that we should also draw upon to help understand how to prepare properly for combat in this new domain.

An Antifragile Approach to Preparing for Cyber Conflict - Historical Analogies, Current U.S. National Cyber Strategic Approach, Probability and Consequence of Positive and Negative Black Swan Events

Department of Defense (Dod)

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