U. S. Military

U. S. Army

Department Of Defense (Dod)

As the United States seeks to maintain its influence abroad, hostile nations and non-state actors will attempt to leverage the low-cost effectiveness of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to disrupt US military operations. These cheap devices, made from relatively easily acquired components, will enable the continued use of the IED on the modern battlefield. While the US spent billions of dollars to counter this seemingly new IED threat, the devices used in Iraq and Afghanistan were similar in nature and effect to the booby traps used in Vietnam. The Army's failure to retain the institutional knowledge gained from its experiences with booby traps in Vietnam resulted in an initial inability to provide support for the detection and clearance of these devices and targeting of assembly/emplacement networks. Instead, the Army rushed the force management process, specifically within the Engineer Regiment, to refocus its efforts, regrow the skillset, and organize to meet the threat. While the major Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) conflicts close, other powers seek to counter United States dominance with methods that do not involve major combat operations. The use of cheap and easily acquired parts for IEDs will support their continued use. Therefore, a key to success in future conflicts is retaining and institutionalizing the knowledge gained through recent experiences while understanding the evolution of threats. Studies of historically noteworthy conflicts often evoke comparison. While history does not repeat itself, common themes emerge regarding actions of each participant and their success or failure. These themes provide a basis for future militaries to incorporate, adapt, or otherwise prepare for encountering these situational eventualities on the battlefield. The US military left Vietnam with robust counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) experiences and knowledge, part of the greater counter-insurgency skillset developed by soldiers assigned to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) between February 1962 and March 1973. However, the military retained little of this experience in doctrine, training, or force structure as the Army's focus shifted to a new operating concept focused on maneuver-centric warfare against a near-peer threat from the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s and 80s. The close of the Cold War in 1990s ended the perceived threat of large scale, force-on-force, warfare for the moment. New threats emerged in Africa and the Balkans; old threats gained renewed interest in the Middle East. From the mid-1990s to the summer of 2001, the Army's focus was on limited warfare and peacekeeping operations. Non-state actors, under the banner of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, forcing the Army to again reassess its focus. The war that followed led to significant investments of time, money, and blood in relearning the C-IED lessons forgotten during thirty years spent avoiding guerrilla warfare using conventional ground forces. While lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan guide today's engineer force structure and training in the C-IED fight, the Engineer Regiment must not lose interest as the focus for the training of tactical and operational units pivots back to major combat operations. Letting today's lessons suffer a fate similar to that of lessons learned during the Vietnam War will place the US Army at a disadvantage if the common threat of effective, low-cost weapons, fades and then reemerges to challenge US maneuver formations.

Getting It Right: The Endurance of Improvised Explosive Device (Ied) Education in the U.S. Army - History of Parallel Lessons on Vietnam

Nicole Breen

The rapid increase of space activity in the 21st century has raised questions about the adequacy of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) to govern orbital activities and prevent future international conflicts. This study analyzes the OST's ability to address critical emerging problems across three issue areas: orbital space debris, the weaponization of space, and asteroid and Moon mining. It concludes by arguing that the language within the OST does not adequately address these emerging problems, which could lead to possible conflicts in each of these issue-areas. This study offers several possible policy recommendations for consideration by U.S. decision makers to promote a future framework of stability and longevity in the use of space: 1) transfer responsibility for tracking non-military satellites and space debris in low earth orbit (LEO) from the military to commercial space companies; 2) review the current 25-year guideline for de-orbiting satellites for adequacy; 3) propose a moratorium to China and Russia on further anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) testing; 4) prohibit nefarious behavior in space, rather than trying to prohibit dual-use technologies; 5) initiate talks with Russia and China to reevaluate and discuss the Moon Treaty; and 6) reach out to interested State Parties in the OST to coordinate future space mining legislation. This study will be divided into five chapters. Chapter I introduced the background information on the OST. It was broken up into two parts to set the reader up for the intended study questions. Part one introduces the history of the OST: events leading up to the treaty, conflicts occurring during 1960s, reasons for making the treaty, and the details of the treaty. Part two transitioned into the present day by depicting the major challenges and growth of the use of outer space. It also addressed the change of key players in space; Russia and the United States are no longer alone in their race to space. Other nations with capable space programs include but are not limited to China, Japan, and India. Commercial actors and wealthy individuals are becoming key players in the race to space. With nations, private citizens, commercial companies, and militaries all vying for their place in space, it could inherently lead to conflict. The final few paragraphs of this chapter discussed the case studies that will be examined to determine whether the OST is adequate as it stands to prevent conflict in the 21st century as new risks or threats have emerged. Chapters II, III, and IV will look at three case studies regarding current challenges in space and analyze them against the OST to determine whether changes, amendments, or a proposal of a new international space treaty/agreement need to be made to prevent conflict. Each case study will begin with a brief history of that issue and whether it was considered during the creation of the OST. Additionally, each case study will examine political, military, and commercial interests and their involvement in current space issues. Chapter II will introduce the first case study on the mitigation of space debris. Chapter III will discuss weaponization in space, potential weapons that could be used in space, and the effects those weapons could potentially have on the United States. Chapter IV will address the future of asteroid and Moon mining and the potential concerns that might come with these new activities. The concluding chapter, Chapter V, summarizes the findings (successes and failures) on whether the OST is adequate as it stands to prevent conflict in the 21st century, highlights the gaps (what is missing?), and provides policy recommendations to the treaty in support of future U.S. or international agreements.

Can the Outer Space Treaty (Ost) Prevent Conflicts in Orbit in the 21st Century? Critical Emerging Problems - Orbital Space Debris, Space Weaponizatio

Steven Rohlena

The United States policy for dealing with a nuclear North Korea has been a combination of containment, deterrence, and limited engagement since 1994. While this policy has prevented war on the Korean peninsula, it has not prevented North Korea from developing a nuclear program and proliferating this technology, as well as missile technology, to numerous countries not friendly to the United States. In order to stop North Korea from transferring weapons technology, the United States needs a new strategic concept. This paper will examine four options that may be used to support the element of the U.S. National Security Strategy of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.The United States policy for dealing with a nuclear North Korea has been a combination of containment, deterrence, and limited engagement since the enactment of the 1994 Agreed Framework. While this and earlier policies have prevented war on the Korean peninsula, such approaches have not prevented North Korea from developing a nuclear program and proliferating this technology, as well as missile technology, to numerous countries not friendly to the United States. In order to stop North Korea from transferring weapons technology, the United States needs a new strategic concept. This paper will examine four options that may be used to support the element of the U.S. National Security Strategy of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.The question is if current U.S. policy has prevented North Korea from developing a nuclear program and exporting its technology to other countries. The answer is no. Even though one of North Korea's demands is to be removed from the list of state sponsored of terrorism, the North has not complied by following policies that would lead to that removal. Gregory J. Moore states that "the United States did not prevent North Korea from acquiring and testing nuclear weapons, despite its deterrent strategies, its diplomatic efforts, its ultimatums, and U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolutions against it." There are signs that the North should comply with the non-proliferation treaty. Gregory L. Schulte writes that, "Since the first atomic bomb was assembled, 18 countries have chosen to dismantle their nuclear weapons programs. Countries such as Argentina, Libya, South Africa, and Switzerland made this decision for a variety reasons, but foremost among them was the desire to improve their international standing. Another important factor was foreign pressure, especially from the United States." However, since the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea has not complied with any agreements they have made. Hence, the six-party talks are an example of failed American diplomacy.

U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Towards North Korea: Nuclear Program, Dprk Belligerent Acts and American Responses, Potential for Military Action, New Ty

Daniel Chaves

Throughout the past 70 years, the alliance between the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has persisted in a dynamic security environment in which South Korea emerged as a middle-power with robust crisis management capabilities. Conversely, the 1995 famine in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) showcased the DPRK's inability to provide basic services; it was the first time the regime solicited international humanitarian assistance, thus allowing international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to operate in the country. Social network analysis helps illuminate how the pedantic political relationship between the two Koreas caused fluctuations within the humanitarian assistance networks to the DPRK. Due to the ROK's humanitarian assistance capabilities and the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the United States is less likely to conduct unilateral humanitarian assistance operations. Although many capable nongovernmental organizations exist on the Korean Peninsula, the ever-changing geopolitical situation between the United States, ROK, and DPRK can restrict their ability to execute humanitarian operations there.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Background * A. Research Question * 1. Deterrence and Strategic Options * 2. U.S. Department of Defense and the Republic of Korea * 3. Nongovernmental Organizations * B. Methodology * C. Chapter Outline * II. Evolution of HADR on the Korean Peninsula * A. Economic Development on the Korean Peninsula and HADR * B. Development and Repression of the Independent Society * C. NGOS and the ROK Government * III. Humanitarian Operations in North Korea 1995-2017 * A. Humanitarian Operations in North Korea 1995-2008 * B. Humanitarian Operations in North Korea 2009-2017 * C. Chapter Conclusion * IV. Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response Network to North Korea * A. Network Boundaries * 1. Network Ties (Relations) * 2. NGO Characteristics (Attributes) * 3. Parsing Network Data by Organizational Capabilities * 4. Network Metrics * 5. Topography * 6. Centrality * B. Temporal Analysis of the NGO/IO Network * C. Chapter Conclusion * V. Conclusions and Recommendations * A. Conclusions * B. Recommendations for U.S. Forces In HADR on the Korean PeninsulaWhen Kim Jong-un took power in the DPRK in 2012, the increase in aggressive actions toward regional allies of the United States, and the deteriorating humanitarian conditions for the North Korean average citizen led to an increase in international pressure to mitigate the menace the country presented to its own citizens and neighboring countries. International pressure on the Kim Regime remains central to these efforts. Acts of aggression, such as testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, have resulted in the toughening of international sanctions. However, attempts to limit the regime's ability to proliferate nuclear weapons through sanctions have also hindered its ability to provide basic services, such as food and medical care to the DPRK's 25 million citizens. That being said, sanctions are only partly responsible for the deteriorating conditions within the country. The strategic choice by the DPRK to focus on weapons development in lieu of medicine and food is also responsible for the poor humanitarian conditions in the country.

Humanitarian Assistance Organizations and Their Role in Crisis Response on the Korean Peninsula - Ngos and North Korea, Rok, and Dprk, Hadr Disaster R

Scott Orr

Recent conflicts have directed much academic and media attention to special operations forces (SOF). Despite the attention, the application of SOF in asymmetric conventional warfare or irregular conflict has not been fully examined in the context of just war theory. In addition, SOF have often been portrayed superficially, painting them as indiscriminate or unscrupulous warriors. This thesis argues to the contrary, that the application of SOF represents an evolution of just war theory in an era of increasingly irregular conflict. This thesis expands just war thinking to activities short of armed conflict. It contends that SOF constitute a unique extension of the ethical principles that morally bind military capabilities under just war theory. Moreover, this thesis examines the moral utility of SOF operations as a means of preventing unnecessary loss of life prior to, during, and in the wake of armed conflict. SOF can function, in both theory and practice, as a distinct moral improvement over most other forms of irregular or indirect conflict, across nearly all phases of conflict. These conclusions aim to provide insight to planners, observers, and policy-makers who seek to understand and efficiently respond to emergent or persistent challenges to global stability and national security. The next chapter discusses in some detail how SOF support objectives during armed conflict. Specifically, the chapter directly speaks to how SOF achieve morally beneficial effects during phases of the continuum of conflict that should be considered large-scale combat operations or major campaigns. The discussion focuses on traditional and revisionist just war logic to demonstrate that large-scale combat forces realize significant moral improvements when SOF precision and nuance are applied in support of objectives during armed conflict. Chapter III illuminates critical shortcomings in just war theory when applied to activities below the level of armed conflict

Just War Theory Reloaded: The Ethics of Sof in Modern Conflict - Special Operations in Irregular Conflicts and Asymmetric Warfare, Contextualizi

This is a compilation of four excellent reports about the American intervention in Siberia and Northern Russia at the end of World War One. The four reports: U.S. Naval Forces in Northern Russia (Archangel and Murmansk), 1918-1919, Logistics in Reverse: The U.S. Intervention in Siberia, 1918-1920, The Polar Bear Expedition: The U.S. Intervention in Northern Russia, 1918-1919, andThe Siberia Expedition 1918-1920: An Early "Operation Other Than War."When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia during November, 1917 they immediately ceased hostilities with the Germans. The potential impact on the Allies was catastrophic. German Eastern Front forces combined with 1.6 million repatriated POW's could be returned to fight on the Western Front. The European Allies quickly demanded that American and Japanese troops be sent to reopen the Eastern Front, launching what would evolve into an early "operation other than war" for American forces. Against the strong opposition of the War Department, President Wilson committed 9000 American troops with a set of strategic goals rendered quickly obsolete by the armistice. Major General William S. Graves, commander of the expedition, underwent 20 months of turmoil translating Wilson's policy into attainable military objectives for the operation, against strong opposition from the other Allies and even the U.S. State Department. At the end of this unpopular operation, Graves' thought he had failed. Yet when the positive outcomes are weighed and the expedition is analyzed by modern standards for this type of operation, Graves achieved remarkable success and deserves a better reputation than what was his fate. Graves struck a balance between operational imperatives and political requirements not often achieved in the potentially disastrous circumstances of conflicting strategic goals.The outbreak of war between Russia and Germany in August 1914 had important effects upon North Russia. The closing of the Baltic ports of Russia and of the exit from the Black Sea through Turkey's joining the Central Power left her only the remote ports on the Arctic Ocean through which to secure military supplies and equipment from her Allies in western Europe, aside from the still more remote port of Vladivostok in Siberia. It became necessary therefore for Russia to develop the northern region to the greatest extent possible and with the greatest possible speed. The only port of any size in Northern Russia in 1914 was Archangel, an imposing and well-built city located on elevated ground on the eastern bank of the North Dvina River where it branches into a number of streams, thirty-three miles from the White Sea. Founded in 1553, when an English trading factory was built there, Archangel had been Russia's only outlet to the sea for many years, but after the building of Petrograd by Peter the Great in 1702 it declined in importance although it continued to be visited by ships from England and the Netherlands. Far from peace time shipping routes, Archangel was 720 miles distant from Moscow and 760 miles from Petrograd. It was connected by river, canal, and rail with the south. In ordinary times it exported lumber, tar, flax, linseeds, and skins. To increase the capacity of the railroad, the terminus of which was at Bakaritza on the west bank of the North Dvina opposite Archangel, it was converted from a single to a double track line in 1916. A temporary railroad was built by the Russians to the port of Economia constructed by the British sixteen miles down the river from Archangel in order to provide a place with a longer open season; this could be reached by ice breakers until the middle of January. The population of Archangel which in 1915 numbered 40,000, increased several fold and the imports many fold during the early years of the war.

U.S. Intervention in Siberia and Northern Russia 1918-1920: The Polar Bear Expedition, Naval Forces in Archangel and Murmansk, Logistics, Siberia Expe

Since the Army reorganized into modular Brigade Combat Teams, US Army divisions have not had a dedicated reconnaissance and security force. This study answers the questions do US Army divisions need a dedicated reconnaissance and security force and if so how should it be organized, equipped, and trained? This study uses history, trends in warfare, and current US Army doctrine to answer the research questions. This monograph finds that divisions need a dedicated division cavalry squadron. Left without a dedicated reconnaissance and security force divisions in World War I, such as 1st Division created scout detachments and requested observation airplanes to aid in reconnaissance and security tasks. For the rest of the 20th century the US Army experimented with the right organization, equipment and training for reconnaissance and security but every division had a dedicated reconnaissance and security force. By the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 3d Infantry Division employed a division cavalry squadron that integrated ground and air capabilities to great effect. Trends in warfare and technology show reconnaissance and security tasks will remain essential as the enemy attempts to remain hidden from US strengths in firepower. Recent combat in Ukraine highlight the lethality of the modern battlefield. The enemy of the future will continue to disperse across the battlefield and will use complex terrain such as megacities to conceal its location and preserve its combat power. Current US Army doctrine describes the need for reconnaissance and security forces in the deep area to shape the division close fight. This study recommends that the Army should organize, equip, and train a dedicated reconnaissance and security force based on the tasks zone reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force and guard. To conduct these tasks, the Army should organize, equip, and train the force keeping in mind four characteristics that will make the force capable of the reconnaissance and security tasks divisions need. First, the organization needs to be able to fight for information and time. Second, divisions need combined ground, aerial and technical reconnaissance abilities. Third, the division reconnaissance and security force needs to move faster both in and out of contact with the enemy and faster than the enemy or the division main body. Fourth, division reconnaissance and security needs to be capable of providing the mission command over a unit capable of the reconnaissance and security tasks expected by the division. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Evolution of Division Reconnaissance and Security Formations 3. Theory of Future Warfare 4. Doctrine 5. Organizing, Equipping, and Training a Division Cavalry Force 6. Conclusion

Fighting Blind: Why U.S. Army Divisions Need a Dedicated Reconnaissance and Security Force - Value of Division Cavalry Squadron for Fu

U. S. Congress

Three comprehensive reports about the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the implications of the Trump Administration withdrawal based on violations by Russia, are reproduced in this compilation. Contents: Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress * Consequences and Context for Russia's Violations of the INF Treaty * China's Missile Program and U.S. Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty * 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat AssessmentThe United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles. NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia's violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017-the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed-the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia's noncompliance as a key factor in that decision. The United States suspended its participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019. Russia responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well.The 2018 version of the State Department report confirmed that Russia continues to be in violation of its obligation "not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." As in past reports, it did not contain details about the capabilities of the offending missile or confirm press reports about the missile's deployment. However, the report indicated that the United States has provided Russia with "information pertaining to the missile and the launcher, including Russia's internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis and the names of the companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher" and "information on the violating GLCM's test history, including coordinates of the tests and Russia's attempts to obfuscate the nature of the program." The report also indicated that the GLCM has a range capability of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and that it is "distinct from the R-500/SSC-7 GLCM or the RS-26 ICBM." It stated that "the United States assesses the Russian designator for the system in question is 9M729."

Department Of Defense (Dod)

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