Hans Binnendijk

Patricj Cronin

This lexicon is inten ded as a tool to he lp strip aw ay one source of the endem ic miscommunication and friction that now plagues both soldiers and civilians, governm ent and non-government, who plan, coordinate, and execute the complex set of overlapping civil-military activities and tasks th at have come to charact erize armed conflicts and their afterm ath. Collectively known as complex operations1, they demand, but too often lack, a sense of common purpose and m utual understanding be tween a wide array of planne rs and practitioners, all of whom bring with them different organizati onal cultures, world visions, and operational approaches. These disconnects can , and too often do, create conf usion, at tim es with tragic results, both on the ground and among policy-m akers. Part of that confusion stem s from the widely varied vocabulary used by these m any actors. Each organization possesses their own unique terminology, perfectly clear to them , but foggy to others. Even when words look and sound familiar they often have quite different and sometimes alien meanings. Anyone who has attended an acronym and jargon -laced coordination meeting of m ilitary, civilian government, and NGO representatives knows the frustration of trying to interpret what is meant by words that have many different connotations. It is in hopes of lessening this confusion that this lexicon has been compiled.

Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operation

Ronald N. Montaperto

PLA Views on Asia Pacific Security in the 21st Century

Patrick Clawson

National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

U.S. Security Challenges in Transition

Strategic Assessment 1995

David C. Gompert

Bonny Lin

The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.

What America and China Can Learn

Blinders, Blunders, and Wars

Hans Binnendijk

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