I. M. Destler

Institute for International Economics (U.S.)

Peter Balint

Peter J. Balint

Imports pour into the United States, up by 79 percent in six years. The trade deficit more than doubles. The House of Representatives solidly rejects a bill that would liberalize global and regional trade and endorses import quotas for a major manufactured product by a two-to-one margin. Although at first glance these events of the 1990s might sound like past chapters of US trade politics, in fact the political dynamics have changed in significant ways. As the impact of globalization comes into focus, politically important constituencies have begun to resist trade liberalization. Labor and environmental groups in particular, demanding that their concerns be addressed, have succeeded in fracturing the long-standing, bipartisan, protrade coalition in Congress, and in the process have undercut US leadership in liberalizing global trade. This new study reexamines the landscape of trade politics. It shows how trade advocates and labor and environmental skeptics differ significantly in both their substantive views and their political and organizational cultures. The authors demonstrate how this new challenge differs from that of traditional trade protectionism, likening it instead to the debate a century ago over whether and how to regulate American capitalism for social purposes. The analysis leads to a set of recommendations aimed at constructive compromise and a new political foundation for US trade policy leadership.

Trade, Labor, and the Environment

The New Politics of American Trade

Hideo Sato

In november 1977, a U. S. trade official led an economic mission to Tokyo to urge changes in Japanese policies. The purpose was to avert what U. S. officials saw as a threatening crisis in bilateral economic relations. He was chosen, in part, for his modest rank and low-key personal style, because the United States's objective was to press issues strongly but privately. Instead, the mission provoked a media storm in Tokyo-so much of a storm that, when the emissary callled upon Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, he was greeted with the words, "I am happy to meet the most famous man in Japan.

Coping with U.S.-Japanese Economic Conflicts

Irving McArthur DESTLER

Awarded the American Political Science Association's Gladys Kammerer award for the best book on US national policy, American Trade Politics examines how the US policymaking process has enabled the United States to reduce its own import barriers and lead the world toward a more open trading regime. Since the 1970s, enormous political changes, compounded by unprecedented US trade deficits, have brought institutional erosion and some backsliding on trade policy.

American Trade Politics

Haruhiro Fukui

Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971

The Textile Wrangle

Ivo H. Daalder

The most solemn obligation of any president is to safeguard the nation's security. But the president cannot do this alone. He needs help. In the past half century, presidents have relied on their national security advisers to provide that help. Who are these people, the powerful officials who operate in the shadow of the Oval Office, often out of public view and accountable only to the presidents who put them there? Some remain obscure even to this day. But quite a number have names that resonate far beyond the foreign policy elite: McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice. Ivo Daalder and Mac Destler provide the first inside look at how presidents from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush have used their national security advisers to manage America's engagements with the outside world. They paint vivid portraits of the fourteen men and one woman who have occupied the coveted office in the West Wing, detailing their very different personalities, their relations with their presidents, and their policy successes and failures. It all started with Kennedy and Bundy, the brilliant young Harvard dean who became the nation's first modern national security adviser. While Bundy served Kennedy well, he had difficulty with his successor. Lyndon Johnson needed reassurance more than advice, and Bundy wasn't always willing to give him that. Thus the basic lesson -- the president sets the tone and his aides must respond to that reality. The man who learned the lesson best was someone who operated mainly in the shadows. Brent Scowcroft was the only adviser to serve two presidents, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. Learning from others' failures, he found the winning formula: gain the trust of colleagues, build a collaborative policy process, and stay close to the president. This formula became the gold standard -- all four national security advisers who came after him aspired to be "like Brent." The next president and national security adviser can learn not only from success, but also from failure. Rice stayed close to George W. Bush -- closer perhaps than any adviser before or since. But her closeness did not translate into running an effective policy process, as the disastrous decision to invade Iraq without a plan underscored. It would take years, and another national security aide, to persuade Bush that his Iraq policy was failing and to engineer a policy review that produced the "surge." The national security adviser has one tough job. There are ways to do it well and ways to do it badly. Daalder and Destler provide plenty of examples of both. This book is a fascinating look at the personalities and processes that shape policy and an indispensable guide to those who want to understand how to operate successfully in the shadow of the Oval Office.

Profiles of the National Security Advisers and the Presidents They Served--From JFK to George W. Bush

In the Shadow of the Oval Office

I. M. Destler

Books

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