S. Rebecca Zimmerman

Ben Connable

Aaron Frank

Benjamin J. Fernandes

Michael J. McNerney

Marek N. Posard

Natasha Lander

Jasen J. Castillo

Dan Madden

Christopher Paul

Ilana Blum

In Hyo Seol

Andrew Parasiliti

"What drives some governments to persevere in war at any price while others choose to stop fighting? It is often less-tangible political and economic variables, rather than raw military power, that ultimately determine national will to fight. In this analysis, the authors explore how these variables strengthen or weaken a government's determination to conduct sustained military operations, even when the expectation of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases. This report is part of a broader RAND Arroyo Center effort to help U.S. leaders better understand and influence will to fight at both the national level and the tactical and operational levels. It presents findings and recommendations based on a wide-ranging literature review, a series of interviews, 15 case studies (including deep dives into conflicts involving the Korean Peninsula and Russia), and reviews of relevant modeling and war-gaming. The authors propose an exploratory model of 15 variables that can be tailored and applied to a wide set of conflict scenarios and drive a much-needed dialogue among analysts conducting threat assessments, contingency plans, war games, and other efforts that require an evaluation of how future conflicts might unfold. The recommendations should provide insights into how leaders can influence will to fight in both allies and adversaries."--Publisher's description.

Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't

National Will to Fight

Forrest E. Morgan

Brian Rosen

Karl P. Mueller

Negeen Pegahi

RAND Project AIR FORCE studied the post-9/11 shift in U.S. defense policy emphasis toward preemptive and preventive attack, asking under what conditions preemptive or preventive attack is worth considering as a response to perceived threats. It considered the role such first-strike strategies are likely to play in future U.S. national security policy. Finally, it identified implications these conclusions have for military planners and policymakers as they prepare to deal with national security threats in the next decade.

Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy

Striking First

William Marcellino

Henry Hargrove

James Sladden

This report defines and describes will to fight and provides a model of unit will to fight that can be applied to ground combat units of any scale. It also provides a theoretical basis for adding will to fight to military war gaming.

Analyzing, Modeling, and Simulating the Will to Fight of Military Units

Will to Fight

Jasen J. Castillo

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