Robert S. Leonard

Jeffrey A. Drezner

The past three decades have seen a number of less-than-successfulefforts to develop high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles. In 1994, theDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in conjunction with the DefenseAirborne Reconnaissance Office, initiated an effort--designated theHigh-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstrator (HAE UAV ACTD) --whose goal was to facilitate the developmentof UAVs through the use of a new and innovative acquisition strategy. Thisreport addresses the effect of that acquisition strategy on the flight testprogram of the two air vehicles: the conventional Global Hawk and thelow-observable DarkStar. The authors found that because DarkStar wascanceled after having logged only 6.5 flight hours, not enough flightexperience was accumulated to allow for an understanding of the vehicle'sflight characteristics or military utility. By contrast, Global Hawkaccumulated ample experience to permit a demonstration of its militaryutility, achieving a level of performance that was close to predicted goals.The precise effect of the HAE UAV acquisition strategy remains the subjectof debate. The strategy did, however, influence some key aspects of theflight test program, most notably its increased contractor involvement andits early operational testing in the form of user demonstrations. The flighttest program also served to illustrate the vital need for early involvementof operational users to bolster the capabilities and perspective of thecontractor.

Jeffrey A. Drezner

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