Jason Harris

Mr. Paolo Mauro

Bryn Battersby

Mr. Raphael A Espinoza

Mr. Gee Hee Hong

Mrs. Sandra V Lizarazo Ruiz

Amanda Sayegh

During the COVID-19 pandemic and global financial crisis, governments swiftly served as financiers of last resort through large financial support measures (FSMs) such as loan and guarantee programs and equity injections in firms. This Staff Discussion Note argues that such FSMs prevented bankruptcies and attenuated the recession by increasing firms’ liquidity, reducing risk premiums, and boosting confidence. But FSMs also carry large and long-lasting fiscal costs and risks. The note presents recommendations for managing the legacies of the COVID-19 programs and preparing for future crises. Ideally, FSMs should be assessed and included in budget plans, though a balance needs to be struck between speed and scrutiny.

The State as Financier of Last Resort

Rafael Romeu

Mr. Ariel J Binder

Mr. Asad Zaman

We draw on a newly collected historical dataset of fiscal variables for a large panel of countries—to our knowledge, the most comprehensive database currently available—to gauge the degree of fiscal prudence or profligacy for each country over the past several decades. Specifically, our dataset consists of fiscal revenues, primary expenditures, the interest bill (and thus both the primary and the overall fiscal deficit), the government debt, and gross domestic product, for 55 countries for up to two hundred years. For the first time, a large cross country historical data set covers both fiscal stocks and flows. Using Bohn’s (1998) approach and other tests for fiscal sustainability, we document how the degree of prudence or profligacy varies significantly over time within individual countries. We find that such variation is driven in part by unexpected changes in potential economic growth and sovereign borrowing costs.

A Modern History of Fiscal Prudence and Profligacy

Mr. Paolo Mauro

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