Naoki Yoshihara

Michele Lombardi

The Theory of Exploitation as the Unequal Exchange of Labour

Soh Kaneko

On the Existence and Characterization of Unequal Exchange in the Free Trade Equilibrium

Manfred Kerber

Colin Rowat

This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, "Pillage and property"), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games' predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents' intrinsic contributions to a coalition's power is identical. In the three-agent game studied: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set's existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory.

Naoki Yoshihara

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