Norman J. Finkel

The insanity defense debate has come full circle, again. The current round began when John Hinckley opened fire; in 1843, it was Daniel M'Naghten who pulled the trigger; the "acts" of both would-be "insanity acquittees" provoked the press, the populace, a President, and a Queen to expressions of outrage, and triggered Congress, the House of Lords, judges, jurists, psychologists, and psychiatrists to debate this most maddening matter. "Insanity" -which has historically been surrounded by defenses, defen ders, and detractors-found itself once again under siege, on trial, and undergoing rigorous cross-examination. Treatises were written on the sub ject, testimony was taken, and new rules and laws were adopted. The dust has settled, but it has not cleared. What is clear to me is that we have got it wrong, once again. The "full circle" analogy and historical parallel to M'Naghten (1843) warrant some elaboration. Hinckley's firing at the President, captured by television and rerun again and again, rekindled an old debate regarding the allegedly insane and punishment (Caplan, 1984; Maeder, 1985; Szasz, 1987), a debate in which the "insanity defense" is centrally situated. The smolderings ignited anew when the Hinckley (1981) jury brought in its verdict-"not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI).

Insanity on Trial

Jeffrey B. Abramson

John Kleinig

Valerie P. Hans

James P. Levine

Shari Seidman Diamond

Nancy J. King

B. Michael Dann

Paula Hannaford-Agor

Julie E. Howe

Trial by jury is one of the most important aspects of the U.S. legal system. A reflective look at how juries actually function brings out a number of ethical questions surrounding juror conduct and jury dynamics: Do citizens have a duty to serve as jurors? Might they seek exemptions? Is it acceptable for jurors to engage in after-hours research? Might a juror legitimately seek to "nullify" the outcome to express disapproval of the law? Under what conditions might jurors make a valid choice to hold out against or capitulate to their fellow jurors? Is it acceptable to form alliances? After trial, are there problems with entering into publishing contracts? Unfortunately, questions such as these have received scant attention from scholars. This book revives attention to these and other issues of jury ethics by collecting new and insightful essays along with responses from leading scholars in the field of jury studies. Is it acceptable for jurors to engage in after-hours research? Might a juror legitimately seek to "nullify" the outcome to express disapproval of the law? After trial, are there problems with entering into publishing contracts? Unfortunately, questions such as these have received scant attention from scholars. This book revives attention to these and other issues of jury ethics by collecting new and insightful essays along with responses from leading scholars in the field of jury studies. Contributors: Jeffrey Abramson, B. Michael Dann, Shari Seidman Diamond, Norman J. Finkel, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Julie E. Howe, Nancy J. King, John Kleinig, James P. Levine, Candace McCoy, G. Thomas Munsterman, Maureen O'Connor, Steven Penrod, Alan W. Scheflin, Neil Vidmar

Juror Conduct and Jury Dynamics

Jury Ethics

Annotation In his systematic analysis of "fairness" and "unfairness," Finkel (psychology, Georgetown U.) discusses how claims of unfair treatment not only inform our judicial system but are implicit in news reports and everyday conversation. As familiar as the concepts are, however, many people confuse "fairness" with "justice" and are clearer about what's "unfair" than what's "fair." By looking at the deeper meanings underlying "unfairness narratives" volunteered by American and international study participants, Finkel creates a typology of basic unfairness categories. He explores unfairness in broad historic, religious, legal, and psychological contexts and shows how age, sex, and culture are likely to play a part in how people perceive unfairness. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

The Typology of Commonsense Unfairness

Not Fair!

In this timely book, Norman Finkel looks at the relationship between the "law on the books," as set down in the Constitution and developed in cases and decisions, and what he calls "commonsense justice" the ordinary citizen's notions of what is just and fair.

Jurors' Notions of the Law

Commonsense Justice

Norman J. Finkel

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