Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Frederick van der Ploeg

The Political Economy of Inflation, Taxation and Government Debt

Does Inequality Cause Inflation?

Ary Lans Bovenberg

Structural Distortions and Decentralized Fiscal Policies in EMU

Xavier Debrun

The paper proposes a theoretical analysis illustrating some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of a rules-based fiscal framework reminiscent of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The analysis offers some insights on the current debate about the SGP. Specifically, greater "procedural" flexibility in the implementation of existing rules may improve welfare, thus increasing the Pact's political acceptability. Here, procedural flexibility designates the enforcer's room to apply well-informed judgment on the basis of underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality policy measures. Yet budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy, possibly destroying the case for flexibility. Also, improved budget monitoring and greater transparency increase the benefits from greater procedural flexibility. Overall, we establish that a fiscal pact based on a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can simultaneously contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending and increase high-quality outlays.

Enforcement and Procedural Flexibility

Implementing the Stability and Growth Pact

The Optimality of a Monetary Union Without a Fiscal Union

Harald Uhlig

An Analysis of the "stability Pact"

Recoge: 1. Introduction. - 2. The command economy. - 3. The decentralized economy. - 4. The loglinearized model. - 5. Laissez-faire: no pension system. - 6. The pension system. - 7. Optimal pension arrangements. - 8. Conclusions.

Pension Systems, Intergenerational Risk Sharing and Inflation

Eric J. Bartelsman

Roel Beetsma

Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries

Why Pay More?

Koen Vermeylen

The Effect of Monetary Unification on Public Debt and Its Real Return

Inflation Targets and Debt Accumulation in a Monetary Union

Political Shocks, Public Debt and the Design of Monetary and Fiscal Institutions

Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt Accumulation?

Exchange Rate Bands and Optimal Monetary Accommodation Under a Dirty Float

Recoge: 1. Introduction. - 2. Apolitical outcome in the absence of scrap. - 3. Political outcome in the absence of scrap. - 4. Analysis with scrap. - 5. Fiscal restrictions. - 6. Concluding remarks.

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Books

Your next favorite book is out there