S. Rebecca Zimmerman

Ben Connable

Aaron Frank

Benjamin J. Fernandes

Michael J. McNerney

Marek N. Posard

Natasha Lander

Jasen J. Castillo

Dan Madden

Christopher Paul

Ilana Blum

In Hyo Seol

Andrew Parasiliti

"What drives some governments to persevere in war at any price while others choose to stop fighting? It is often less-tangible political and economic variables, rather than raw military power, that ultimately determine national will to fight. In this analysis, the authors explore how these variables strengthen or weaken a government's determination to conduct sustained military operations, even when the expectation of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases. This report is part of a broader RAND Arroyo Center effort to help U.S. leaders better understand and influence will to fight at both the national level and the tactical and operational levels. It presents findings and recommendations based on a wide-ranging literature review, a series of interviews, 15 case studies (including deep dives into conflicts involving the Korean Peninsula and Russia), and reviews of relevant modeling and war-gaming. The authors propose an exploratory model of 15 variables that can be tailored and applied to a wide set of conflict scenarios and drive a much-needed dialogue among analysts conducting threat assessments, contingency plans, war games, and other efforts that require an evaluation of how future conflicts might unfold. The recommendations should provide insights into how leaders can influence will to fight in both allies and adversaries."--Publisher's description.

Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't

National Will to Fight

William Marcellino

Henry Hargrove

James Sladden

This report defines and describes will to fight and provides a model of unit will to fight that can be applied to ground combat units of any scale. It also provides a theoretical basis for adding will to fight to military war gaming.

Analyzing, Modeling, and Simulating the Will to Fight of Military Units

Will to Fight

Michael Shurkin

Stephanie Pezard

"This report examines Mali's counterterrorism requirements in light of recent evolutions in the country's security environment. In spite of the achievements of France, the United Nations, and the European Union, the terrorist threat in Mali is growing, but Mali's military remains largely ineffective. Part of the challenge is the interconnected nature of Mali's terrorist problem and the political strife that afflicts Mali's northern half, which the peace agreement signed in Algiers in June 2015 only somewhat addresses. Moreover, Bamako's response remains focused to an inappropriate degree on acquiring the military capabilities it hopes will help redress the balance of power in the North while leveraging proxy ethnic militias. These militias, though more effective on the battlefield than Mali's own forces, have the potential to further aggravate northern Mali's instability. The report argues that it is not possible to strengthen Mali's counterterrorism capabilities in isolation from its general military capabilities, which are in need of fundamental reforms. Such reforms should include making the armed forces more inclusive of minority groups and more attentive to relations with northern communities, improving the effectiveness and accountability of defense institutions, building human capital and leadership, and enhancing operational capabilities. In all cases, the United States must coordinate its efforts with the other actors on the ground in Mali, especially the French and the European Union, to ensure complementarity."--Publisher's web site.

Improving Counterterrorism Capabilities

Mali's Next Battle

Michael Spirtas

Thomas-Durell Young

When appropriate, the U.S. Air Force needs to be prepared to supply joint task force (JTF) headquarters. The authors discuss the theory and practice of JTFs, survey command-related developments in the Department of Defense, examine four JTF operations, and consider requirements for JTF headquarters. They use this analysis to develop recommendations to improve U.S. Air Force-led JTF headquarters.

Air Force Command of Joint Operations

What it Takes

S. Rebecca Zimmerman

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