Sven Walter

Heinz-Dieter Heckmann

Physicalism—the thesis that everything there is in the world, including our minds, is constituted by basic physical entities—has dominated the philosophy of mind during the last few decades. But although the conceptual foundations of the physicalist agenda—including a proper explication of notions such as ‘causation’, ‘determination’, ‘realization’ or even ‘physicalism’ itself—must be settled before more specific problems (e.g. the problems of mental causation and human agency) can be satisfactorily addressed, a comprehensive philosophical reflection on the relationships between the various key concepts of the debate on physicalism is yet missing. This book presents a range of essays on the conceptual foundations of physicalism, mental causation and human agency, written by established and leading authors in the field.

The Metaphysics of Mind and Action

Physicalism and Mental Causation

Wie frei sind wir? Ist der freie Wille eine Illusion? Mit dem Disput zwischen Philosophie und empirischen Wissenschaften um unsere Freiheit greift dieser Band eine Debatte auf, die in jüngster Zeit nicht nur akademisch mit Vehemenz geführt wurde, sondern auch auf breite öffentliche Resonanz gestoßen ist. Der Autor kritisiert den empirischen Angriff auf unseren freien Willen, stellt aber zugleich die abstrakte philosophische Freiheitsdebatte auf eine solide empirische Basis und deckt so nicht nur die Grenzen, sondern auch die Perspektiven einer empirischen Annäherung an die philosophische Frage Wie frei sind wir? auf.

Grenzen einer empirischen Annäherung an ein philosophisches Problem

Illusion freier Wille?

Ansgar Beckermann

Brian McLaughlin

The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: its ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory, imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of one's own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind will be an invaluable resource for advanced students and scholars of philosophy, and also for researchers in neighbouring disciplines seeking a high-level survey of the state of the art in this flourishing field.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Marc Slors

Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence

Achim Stephan

Wann finden geistige Prozesse statt? Zum Beispiel, wenn wir emotional sind, uns erinnern oder träumen. Mit innovativen Beiträgen stellt das Handbuch kognitive Leistungen wie Erinnerung, Lernen, Planen, Wahrnehmung oder Sprache vor beim Menschen, aber auch im Hinblick auf künstliche Systeme wie Computer oder Roboter. Es beleuchtet die verschiedenen Modelle kognitiver Systeme, darunter das Computermodell des Geistes, neuronale Netze oder dynamische Systeme. Mit den Fächern Anthropologie, Informatik, Linguistik, Neurowissenschaft, Psychologie und Philosophie führt es in die Teildisziplinen der Kognitionswissenschaft ein.

Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft

Torin Alter

What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts--knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts--have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room. According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts? The papers in this volume engage with the latest developments in this debate. The authors' perspectives range widely. For example, Daniel Dennett argues that anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument are simply confused; David Papineau grants that such arguments at least reveal important features of phenomenal concepts; and David Chalmers defends the anti-physicalist arguments, arguing that the "phenomenal concept strategy" cannot succeed.

Sven Walter

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