Name: Guerilla Warfare
ISBN: 9788187496847

Ernesto Che Guevara

Guerilla Warfare

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For Che, the role of the guerrilla fighter was to be a catalyst that could accelerate the conditions of struggle among the people, consistent with the principle that the role of the revolutionary is not to sit back and wait to see the cadaver of imperialism pass by, but to facilitate the conditions that lead to its collapse.

There is a pejorative saying: “The guerrilla fighter is the Jesuit of warfare.” This suggests qualities of treachery, of surprise, of secretiveness, that are obviously essential elements of guerrilla warfare. Naturally, it is a special kind of Jesuitism, promoted by circumstances, which necessitate acting at certain moments in ways different from the romantic and sporting conceptions with which we are taught to believe war is fought.

The guerrilla is ready to give his or her life, but the positive feature of guerrilla warfare is that each guerrilla fighter is ready to die not just to defend an idea but to make that idea a reality.

To begin with, this work among the people should be aimed at ensuring secrecy; that is, each peasant, each member of the community in which the action is taking place, will be asked not to mention what he or she sees and hears; later, help can be sought from those local residents whose loyalty to the revolution offers greater guarantees; later on, these persons can be used in contact missions, to transport goods or arms, or as guides in the zones familiar to them; after that, it is possible to establish organized mass action in workplaces, of which the final result will be the general strike.

A feature of this mobile war is the “minuet,” so named for its similarity to the dance: the guerrilla bands encircle an enemy position, such as an advancing column; it is surrounded completely from the four points of the compass,14 with five or six guerrillas at each point, far enough away to avoid being encircled themselves; the battle is started at any one of the points, and the army moves toward it; the guerrillas then retreat, always maintaining visual contact, and initiate an attack from another point. The army will repeat its action and the guerrilla band the same. Thus, successively, an enemy column can be kept immobilized, and forced to expend large quantities of ammunition, weakening the morale of its troops at no great risk to the guerrillas.

The numerical inferiority of the guerrilla band makes it necessary that attacks are always carried out by surprise; this is the great advantage that allows the guerrillas to inflict losses on the enemy without suffering losses themselves.

At any rate, wellmanaged sabotage is always a very effective weapon. It should not be used to immobilize means of production, which would paralyze a sector of the population (in other words, leave them unemployed), unless this also affects the normal life of the society. Sabotage against a soft-drink factory is ridiculous, but sabotage against a power plant is absolutely correct and advisable. In the first instance, a certain number of workers are put out of work without disrupting the rhythm of industry; in the second case, there will also be displaced workers, but this is entirely justified by the paralysis of regional life. We will return to the technique of sabotage later.

One of the enemy’s weakest points is road and rail transportation. It is virtually impossible to guard every meter of a transport route, a road, or a railroad. At any point a considerable amount of explosives can be planted that will make the road impassable; and by detonating explosives when a vehicle passes by, besides cutting off the road, considerable loss of life and materiel can be inflicted on the enemy.

It is a good policy to take no prisoners while there are no significant operational bases and no unassailable positions. Survivors should be set free. The wounded should be cared for with all available resources at the time of the action. Conduct toward the civil population should be governed by great respect for all the customs and traditions of the people of the zone, in order to demonstrate effectively, through deeds, the moral superiority of the guerrilla fighter over the oppressing soldier.

Aircraft cannot see anything in these zones and cease to operate; tanks and cannons cannot do much because of the difficulties of advancing.

In certain cases guerrilla fighters will be able to maintain their peacetime work, but this is very difficult; practically speaking, the urban guerrilla band is constituted by a group of individuals who are already outside the law, in a situation of war, in unfavorable conditions as already described.

A wounded enemy should be treated with care and respect unless his former life warrants the death penalty, in which case he will be treated according to his deserts. Prisoners can never be kept unless a secure base of operations, invulnerable to the enemy, has been established. Otherwise, the prisoner will become a dangerous menace to the security of the local people of the region or to the guerrilla band itself, because of the information that he can give on rejoining the enemy army. If he has not been a notorious criminal, he should be set free after receiving a lecture.

A common and extremely important comfort in the guerrilla fighter’s life is a smoke, such as cigars, cigarettes, or pipe tobacco; a smoke is a great friend to the solitary soldier in moments of rest. Pipes are useful, because they mean every last piece of tobacco from the butts of cigars and cigarettes can be used at times of scarcity. 

The conduct of the guerrilla fighter will be judged whenever he approaches a house to ask for something. The residents will draw favorable or unfavorable conclusions about the guerrilla band depending on the manner in which any service, food, or other necessity is solicited, and the methods used to get what is wanted. The chief should discuss this problem in detail, emphasizing its importance; he should also teach by example. On entering a town, all drinking of alcohol should be prohibited and the troops should be exhorted beforehand to display the best possible discipline. The entrances and exits to the town should be constantly watched.

We said before that the nature of fire in a battle indicates the location of the opposing forces: on one side, violent and rapid f iring by the soldier of the line, who has plenty of ammunition as a rule; on the other side, the methodical, sporadic fire of the guerrilla fighter who knows the value of every bullet and who endeavors to expend it with the greatest economy, never firing one shot more than necessary.

Every act of the guerrilla army should always be accompanied by propaganda explaining the reasons for it. 

The transport of things, messages, or money, small items and those of great importance, should be assigned to women in whom the guerrilla army has total confidence; women can act as couriers using a thousand tricks; it is a fact that however brutal the repression, however thorough the search, a woman receives less harsh treatment than a man and can carry her message or an important or confidential object to its destination.

Sabotage can be of two types: sabotage on a national scale against particular targets, and local sabotage against combat lines. Sabotage on a national scale should be aimed principally at destroying communications. Each type of communication can be destroyed in a different way; all of them are vulnerable. For example, telegraph and telephone poles are easily destroyed by sawing them almost all the way through, so that at night they appear to be in normal condition, until a sudden kick brings one pole down and this drags along with it all those that are weak, producing a major power failure.

Nevertheless, the radio should be ruled by the fundamental principle of popular propaganda, which is the truth; it is preferable to tell the truth, however insignificant, than a large lie, artfully embellished. The radio should give reports, especially of battles, of all kinds of encounters, and assassinations committed by the repression; it should also give doctrinal orientations and practical lessons to the civil population; and, from time to time, speeches by the revolutionary leaders.

As the spontaneous forms of popular collaboration are established and organized, it is possible to use the intelligence apparatus not only as an extremely important backup but also as a weapon of attack by using its personnel, for example, as “sowers of fear.” Pretending to be on the side of the enemy soldiers, they sow fear and instability by spreading discouraging news. Mobility, the basic tactic, can be developed to the maximum. By knowing exactly the places where the enemy troops are going to attack, it is easy to avoid them, or when the time is ripe, to attack them where they least expect it.

Che Guevara

Ernesto Guevara

Che Guevara, the larger-than-life hero of the 1959 revolutionary victory that overturned the Cuban dictatorship, believed that revolution would also topple the imperialist governments in Latin America. Che's call to action, his proclamation of invincibil