George examines under what circumstances the threat of force will achieve enough to obviate the need for force. He discusses seven cases of failure and success: U.S.-Japanese relations leading to Pearl Harbor; the Laos crisis of 1961-62; the Cuban missile crisis; the use of air power in Vietnam circa 1965; the Reagan Administration's use of coercive diplomacy against the Sandinistas' Nicaragua; U.S. coercive diplomacy against Libya in 1985-86; and the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91. George offers some interesting conclusions. Coercive diplomacy is more likely to work when the objective is clear; motivation is high; motivation is asymmetrical between threatener and threatened; both parties have some sense of urgency about resolving the conflict; adequate domestic and international support for coercive diplomacy exists; the target fears escalation more than capitulation; and clear settlement terms exist. ISBN 1-878379-14-3 (pbk.): $10.95.